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Why Anti-Surcharge Laws Do Not Violate a Merchant's Freedom of Speech 
Abstract 
First Amendment litigation is surrounding state anti-surcharge laws, which prevent merchants from 
imposing surcharges on transactions where customers use credit cards. These laws effectively prevent 
stores from passing credit card "swipe fees" onto their customers. Merchants argue that because the 
laws still allow them to provide discounts to customers who use other forms of payment, the laws violate 
their First Amendment rights by impermissibly restricting the way the stores can communicate. The state 
governments, in contrast, have defended the laws by asserting that they regulate conduct, not business 
speech, and therefore do not violate the First Amendment. 
The Supreme Court in Expressions Hair Design v. Schneidermananswered part of the inquiry when it held 
that New York's anti-surcharge law violated speech, not conduct. Now, the case will return to the Second 
Circuit, which will determine whether it survives constitutional scrutiny. This Comment argues that anti-
surcharge laws do not violate the First Amendment because they regulate speech that relates to 
commercial transactions and are thus categorized as commercial speech. Further, this Comment argues 
that state anti-surcharge laws survive the intermediate scrutiny applied to commercial speech as 
established by Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York. 
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established by Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service
Commission of New York.
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INTRODUCTION
Suppose that a shortage of soft beverages has changed the way that
Florida's restaurants serve drinks. Rather than pouring them to fill a
glass, the average restaurant only pours beverages halfway. A drink
filled to the brim is out of the question. Tourist complaints of the
meager and overpriced drinks at Floridian establishments cast a
negative light on the state's restaurant industry; when restaurant
profits plummet, the state fears that tourism profits are next. To save
its reputation, Florida decides that it must regulate the restaurant
industry more closely. It determines a positive message for restaurants
to convey and passes a law that dictates how these establishments may
describe soft drinks.
The law is simple: it prevents restaurants from serving "half-empty"
beverages but allows them to provide drinks labeled "half-full." There
is no additional regulatory scheme in place, and the law does not
actually mandate that restaurants provide a greater quantity of the
beverages they serve; a violation hinges entirely on a restaurant's
choice of words.' Restaurant owners recognize the law as a restriction
on their constitutional right to free speech,' and a group of
restaurateurs files suit against the state, fervently litigating the law to
the appellate level. Finding that the law directly targets the content that
restaurant owners communicate to patrons' and that it is not commercial
speech that the government may regulate,' the appellate court strikes
down the restaurant mandate as a violation of the First Amendment.
1. This hypothetical is a more elaborate version of the Eleventh Circuit's
imagined situation in Dana's Railroad Supply v. Attorney General offZorida. 807 F.3d 1235,
1245 (11th Cir. 2015), reheaing denied en banc, 809 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2016), cert.
denied sub nom. Bondi v. Dana's R.R. Supply, 137 S. Ct. 1452 (2017). There, the court
explained that if criminal liability rests on whether a restaurateur uses the term "half-
full" or "half-empty," then the regulation impermissibly "discriminates against
expression on the basis of content" instead of regulating conduct. Id.
2. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (declaring that "Congress shall make no law ...
abridging the freedom of speech"); Police Dep't of the City of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S.
92, 95 (1972) (asserting that "above all else, the First Amendment means that
government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its
subject matter, or its content").
3. See infra Section I.A.2 (describing the evolution of the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence on commercial speech).
4. See KATHLEEN ANN RUANE, CONG. RESEARCH SERv., 95-815, FREEDOM OF SPEECH
AND PRESS: ExCEPIONS TO THE FIRST AMENDMENT 5-6 (2014) (explaining that the
government may only enforce content-based restrictions on speech when such
restrictions are the least obstructive means of furthering a compelling state interest);
see also infra Section L.A (describing instances in which protected speech may be
subjected to government regulation).
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While this scenario may seem far-fetched, the Eleventh Circuit in
Dana's Railroad Supply v. Attorney General of Florida relied on a similar
hypothetical to determine whether a Florida law regulating credit card
swipe fees (1) implicated and (2) violated storeowners' constitutional
rights under the First Amendment.' The plaintiffs, a group of Florida
merchants,. argued that -because the law prevented them from
imposing surcharges, or fees, on credit card transactions, but allowed
them to provide discounts on non-credit card transactions, the law
violated their First Amendment rights.' They maintained that the
Florida law regulated their speech rather than their business conduct.'
Though the Eleventh Circuit acknowledged that lawful regulations
may sometimes implicate speech without violating the First
Amendment, it ultimately found for the plaintiffs.' The court held that
the statute "directly target[ed] speech [and] indirectly affect[ed]
commercial behavior,""o reasoning that there was "no legally salient
difference between" the anti-surcharge law and the court's glass half-
full mandate similar to the one hypothesized above." The court
interpreted the anti-surcharge law as a "hybrid" of both commercial
speech, which is subject to intermediate scrutiny, and "plain old-
fashioned speech suppression," which is subject to strict scrutiny.12 It
concluded that the law would fail either test," so it applied an
intermediate scrutiny analysis."
5. 807 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2015).
6. Id. at 1245-46; see also Fla. Stat. § 501.0117(1) (2016) (providing that "[a]
seller ... may not impose a surcharge on the buyer . .. for electing to use a credit card
in lieu of payment by cash, check, or similar means"); supra note 2 and accompanying
text.
7. Dana's R. Supply, 807 F.3d at 1239-40.
8. See § 501.0117(1) ("[Section 501.0117(1)] does not apply to the offering of a
discount for the purpose of inducing payment by cash, check, or other means not
involving the use of a credit card, if the discount is offered to all prospective
customers."); Dana's RR Supply, 807 F.3d at 1239-40.
9. Dana's PR Supply, 807 F.3d at 1241-42, 1251 (acknowledging that laws
regulating conduct are mere economic regulations that are only subject to rational-
basis review).
10. Id. at 1239 ("[The law] discriminat[es] on the basis of the speech's content,
the identity of the speaker, and the message being expressed. Because the at-best
plausible justifications on which the [anti]-surcharge law rest provide no firm anchor,
the law crumbles under any level of heightened First Amendment scrutiny.").
11. Id. at 1245-46 (ridiculing the possibility that someone could be criminally
liable for picking one of two valid ways of describing "an objective reality").
12. Id. at 1246-49 (finding that the statute contained both "the flavor of
commercial speech" and "plain old-fashioned speech suppression").
13. Id. at 1248-49.
14. Id.
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Diluting the issue through the use of its glass half-full hypothetical
allowed the Eleventh Circuit's decision to appear compelling and
establish a First Amendment argument in a way that ignored the
nuances of Florida's law. The court clung to the rhetorical charm of
its own hypothetical, swiftly asserting that the law unconstitutionally
restricted speech through a brief and dismissive intermediate scrutiny
analysis." The decision's thorough dissent and the lower court's prior
dismissal of the First Amendment claim further highlighted the
inadequacies of the Eleventh Circuit's holding."1
Obscure as the issue may seem, Dana's Railroad Supply increased
tensions around whether anti-surcharge laws regulated speech and
possibly violated First Amendment freedoms or whether they lawfully
regulated business conduct. Similar invocations of the First
Amendment and anti-surcharge laws are prevalent." The Supreme
Court in Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman (Expressions I) 1 "
recently resolved part of the analysis by classifying New York's anti-
surcharge law as a regulation of speech rather than a regulation of
15. See id. at 1249-51 (applying the four-pronged Central Hudson test and
dismissing any possibility that the law could further a substantial government interest).
16. See id. at 1252-53 (Carnes, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority's colloquial
interpretation of "surcharge" and deeming the decision "a fatal constitutional flaw");
Dana's R.R Supply v. Bondi, No. 4:14cv134-RH/CAS, 2014 WL 11189176, at *1-2
(N.D. Fla. Sept. 2, 2014) (asserting that "[r]estrictions on pricing are economic
measures subject only to rational-basis scrutiny" and acknowledging that a "whole host
of statutes impose similar restrictions on the relationships between businesses and
their customers, and many implicate communications").
17. See Rowell v. Pettijohn, 816 F.3d 73, 82 (5th Cir. 2016) (holding that Texas's
anti-surcharge law is a permissible regulation of economic conduct that incidentally
impacts speech), vacated, 137 S. Ct. 1431 (2017); Expressions Hair Design v.
Schneiderman (Expressions 1), 808 F.3d 118, 121-22 (2d. Cir. 2015) (upholding a
statute that barred merchants from posting one price for a product and charged an
additional fee to customers who paid with a credit card, even though the same law
allowed merchants to offer discounts to customers paying in cash), vacated, 137 S. Ct.
1144 (2017); Italian Colors Rest. v. Harris, 99 F. Supp. 3d 1199, 1210 (E.D. Cal. 2015)
(striking down a California anti-surcharge law aimed at "prevent~ing an] unfair
surprise to consumers at the cash register" because the overly-broad law placed a
"content based, speaker-specific restriction on consumer speech"); see also Lisa
Soronen, Remember Reed: Might Supreme Court Apply it to Commercial Speech?, INT'L MUN.
LAws. Ass'N: APP. PRAC. BLOG (Oct. 25, 2016),
http://blog.imla.org/2016/1 0/remember-reed-might-supreme-court-apply-it-to-
commercial-speech (noting that until a recent antitrust suit forced credit card
companies to change their contract terms, contracts between the companies and
vendors prohibited vendors from imposing surcharges on customers for credit card
transactions).
18. 137 S. Ct. 1144 (2017).
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conduct." The Court found that though the law implicates business
conduct, it "is not like a typical price regulation" because it regulates
how sellers can communicate their prices."o The Court did, however,
remand the case to the Second Circuit, leaving the lower court to
complete the second half of the analysis: deciding which level of
scrutiny should apply and determining whether the law at issue passes
constitutional muster." This holding vindicated the Eleventh Circuit's
decision, at least in part." It also outdated similar Second and Fifth
Circuit precedents, settling what had been a circuit split on the issue
of whether anti-surcharge laws regulated speech or conduct. 3  By
remanding the New York anti-surcharge case back to the Second
Circuit for further proceedings, the Supreme Court left the
constitutionality of the state laws open for debate.
This Comment argues that even though anti-surcharge laws regulate
speech, not conduct, they fall under the category of commercial
speech and are thus subject to intermediate scrutiny rather than strict
scrutiny. This Comment further argues that under an intermediate
scrutiny analysis, the laws do not violate a merchant's freedom of
speech because they easily survive this level of scrutiny. Part I
19. Id. at 1147, 1150-51.
20. Id. at 1150-51.
21. Id. at 1146.
22. Id. at 1152.
23. Id. The Fifth Circuit found that a law banning surcharges for customers paying
with credit cards regulated economic conduct and only incidentally affected speech;
conversely, the Eleventh Circuit struck down a similar law for affecting speech as well
as price. Rowell v. Pettijohn, 816 F.3d 73, 82 (5th Cir. 2016), vacated, 137 S. Ct. 1431
(2017); Dana's R.R. Supply v. Att'y Gen. of Fla., 807 F.3d 1235, 1245 (11th Cir. 2015),
rehearing denied en banc, 809 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2016), cert. denied sub nom. Bondi v.
Dana's R.R. Supply, 137 S. Ct. 1452 (2017). The Second Circuit upheld a law banning
surcharges for customers paying with credit after finding that the law regulated only
prices and not speech. Amy Howe, justices Add Eight New Cases to Docket for Upcoming
Term, SCOTUSBLOG (Sept. 29, 2016, 11:14 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/
09/justices-add-eight-new-cases-to-docket-for-upcoming-term. But see Brief in
Opposition for Respondent Eric T. Schneiderman at 7, Expressions Hair Design v.
Schneiderman, No. 15-1391 (cert. granted Sept. 29, 2016) (arguing that the Second
Circuit's decision did not introduce a circuit split because the Eleventh Circuit
construed the Florida law "as having a different meaning and applying to different
pricing practices than the New York and Texas statutes"). See generally Matthew
Moloshok, Free Speech Versus Fair Markets: Will Credit-Card Surcharge Cases Supercharge the
First Amendment?, THE ANTITRUST SOURCE, Feb.- 2017, at 1-9,
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/antitrust-source/febl7
_moloshok2_16f.authcheckdam.pdf (arguing that "[d]eploying the First
Amendment to invalidate conduct-based statutes wields a weapon that could be turned
against important consumer protection regulation, and even some antitrust
doctrines").
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investigates the contours of the First Amendment, focusing on the
reality that its protections are not absolute. Additionally, Part I
illustrates the federal history of state anti-surcharge laws, examines the
three opinions forming the circuit split, and summarizes the Supreme
Court's decision in Expressions II.
Part II analyzes the First Amendment issue courts face when
analyzing anti-surcharge laws and argues that these laws survive
intermediate scrutiny because they are reasonably related to important
state interests. Part II then illustrates how the Eleventh Circuit's
interpretation downplayed the commercial nature of the law and
.relied too heavily on a contrived hypothetical comparison. Part III re-
examines Expressions II, arguing that on remand, the Second Circuit
should classify New York's anti-surcharge law as commercial speech
and uphold it under an intermediate scrutiny analysis. In addition,
Part III argues that if the Second Circuit does not categorize the anti-
surcharge law as commercial speech, it can either certify the case to
the New York Court of Appeals for a more definitive interpretation of
the statute or uphold the law as a valid disclosure requirement. Finally,
this Comment concludes that when courts overextend First Amendment
protections, they trivialize and harm the freedom of speech.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Tracing the Contours of the First Amendment: Constitutional Limits on
the Scope of Free Speech
The First Amendment reflects some of the most essential concepts
of freedom and liberty.2 4  However, public reverence for First
Amendment protections makes it increasingly difficult for courts to
confine its borders; when a freedom is so essential, it is sometimes
inconceivable to recognize that it is not absolute. Drawing boundaries
around areas of protected speech often leads to quarrels rather than
consensus, even though there are necessary limits to the First
Amendment's protections, such as restricting obtuse or obscene language.
Among the most common of these quarrels is whether the First
Amendment is applicable to the speech in question. Often, lawful
24. See, e.g., United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943)
("[The First Amendment] presupposes that right conclusions are more likely to be
gathered out of a multitude of tongues, than through any kind of authoritative
selection. To many this is, and always will be, folly; but we have staked upon it our
all."); William 0. Douglas, Lauterbach Award Address in New York 6 (Dec. 3, 1952)
("Restriction of free thought and free speech is the most dangerous of all subversions.
It is the one un-American act that could most easily defeat us.").
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regulations that incidentally affect speech fall outside the scope of the
First Amendment. 5 For example, Congress can prohibit employers
from race-based discrimination while hiring."6 As a result, laws
preventing employers from including "White Applicants Only" on
their job postings do not fall within the First Amendment's purview. 7
Alternatively, there is speech considered so harmful to society that the
First Amendment does not protect it at all," and courts afford that
speech a lesser extent of constitutional protection to preserve societal
interests.' For instance, an advertisement for a gas and electronic
company-considered commercial speech, or "speech [that proposes]
a commercial transaction""-may be subject to a more extensive set of
government regulations and a lower level of judicial scrutiny than
other constitutionally protected expressions.
The result is an intricate body of case law that is often as frustrating
to societal norms as it is fundamental to civil liberties. Critics gripe
that the current jurisprudence remains unable "to formulate clear
explanations and coherent rules capable of elucidating and charting
the contours of [First Amendment] ground [s]."` Likewise, the Court
25. Ruane, supra note 4, at 9. For example, the Supreme Court upheld a
regulation banning camping outside of designated spaces in some national parks in
Washington, D.C., even though it incidentally limited the expression of advocates
camping in the park to protest issues affecting the homeless. Clark v. Cmty. for
Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 290 (1984). The Court found that the
Government had a substantial interest in maintaining the parks in the heart of the U.S.
capital for a myriad of visitors and that the regulation was narrowly focused on that
interest. Id. at 296.
26. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Inst. Rights, 547 U.S. 47, 62 (2006).
27. Id.
28. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (a person may not falsely
shout "FIRE!" in a movie theater); Ruane, supra note 4, at 1, 3 (explaining that obscene
materials are not protected by the First Amendment, and that people may not possess
child pornography, much less produce or purchase any material depicting sexual
conduct by children).
29. See Ruane, supra note 4, at 1-5.
30. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557,
559, 561-63, 566 (1980) (articulating a four-part test for determining the
constitutionality of a commercial speech restriction).
31. See Ruane, supra note 4, at 14-17 (demonstrating that enhanced government
regulation of commercial speech is important because the government has an interest
in protecting consumers by ensuring that advertisements convey accurate
information).
32. Robert Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 88
CAL. L. REV. 2353, 2355 (2000).
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continues its long history of interpreting and re-interpreting the First
Amendment's scope."
This convoluted landscape contextualizes the Eleventh Circuit's
analysis of Florida's anti-surcharge law and highlights how the
Eleventh Circuit's simplified glass half-full hypothetical exacerbated
the issue.' In the Eleventh Circuit hypothetical, the First Amendment
is applicable because the imagined regulation is not motivated by a
desire to regulate some other conduct; instead, the law regulates
speech in an attempt to control the words that restaurants use to
describe their beverage offerings," falling within First Amendment
territory. The hypothetical thus circumvents the entire question of
whether the anti-surcharge law regulates speech or conduct-a critical
first step in commercial speech jurisprudence'-and blatantly
overstates the Florida law's simplicity? After concluding that the First
Amendment applied to the challenged measure, the Eleventh Circuit
turned to the question of applying the appropriate standard of review.
Though the court acknowledged the latitude given to legislatures in
33. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 286-87 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
("The Court in this and in other cases places speech under an expanding legislative
control .... [The majority] puts free speech under the legislative thumb.").
34. Dana's RR Supply v. Att'y Gen. of Fla., 807 F.3d 1235, 1245-46 (11th Cir.
2015) (describing Florida's regulation against additional fees for customers paying
with credit cards as arbitrarily "govern [ing] how to express relative values"), rehearing
denied en banc, 809 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2016), cert. denied sub nom. Bondi v. Dana's R.R.
Supply, 137.S. Ct. 1452 (2017).
35. Id. at 1245.
36. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404, 406 (1989) (noting that the
government has a freer hand in restricting conduct and that not all conduct is speech).
37. Dana's RR Supply, 807 F.3d at 1245-46 (introducing the hypothetical glass
half-full mandate as a content- and viewpoint-based restriction on speech where
liability "turns solely on the restaurateurs' choice of words"). Even though the
Supreme Court eventually held New York's anti-surcharge law regulated speech and
not conduct-implying that Florida's anti-surcharge law is also likely a direct
regulation on speech-the debate over whether anti-surcharge laws regulate conduct
or speech was legitimate. See generally Expressions II, 137 S. Ct. 1144, 1150-51 (2017)
(examining whether New York's law regulated speech or conduct, and finding that
because it was "not .. . a typical price regulation," it regulated speech). Thus, the
Eleventh Circuit overlooked half of the complexity surrounding Florida's law by
equating it to a hypothetical that could not possibly involve a question of conduct
versus speech. See Dana's R.R Supply, 807 F.3d at 1248 (following its conclusion that
the Florida law directly regulated speech with an assertion that the "whole point" of
the law was to "impos[e] a direct and substantial burden on disfavored speech-by
silencing it"). But see id. at 1243 (acknowledging the complexity of determining
whether a regulation targets speech or conduct).
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regulating commercial activity,' it belittled the possibility that a
"governmental interest ... would be served by the no-surcharge law"
and found that Florida's anti-surcharge law failed an intermediate
scrutiny analysis.'
1. The line between speech and conduct
By recognizing the importance of a state's ability to legislate in the
interests of its citizens40 and by identifying the defining features of
freedoms the First Amendment does or does not protect," courts
acknowledge that a law's ability to impact speech does not necessarily
render it unconstitutional." Consistent with the latitude courts afford
states in regulating business conduct, courts find restrictions on
economic activity that implicate speech as distinct from restrictions on
constitutionally protected expressions.' For example, the Supreme
Court has repeatedly held that a state's lawful ability to regulate
business conduct may impose incidental burdens on a merchant's
38. See id. at 1242 (quoting Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483,
487 (1955)) ("By contrast, legislatures are given wide latitude to 'balance the
advantages and disadvantages' when choosing whether and how to regulate
commercial behavior.").
39. Id. at 1248-49 (stating that the Eleventh Circuit "struggle [d] to identify a
plausible governmental interest" for the law, ultimately analyzing Florida's law under
intermediate scrutiny).
40. See, e.g., Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 523-24 (1934) (quoting City of New
York v. Miln, 36 U.S. 102, 139 (1837)) (recognizing that "it is not only the right, but
the bounden and solemn duty of a state, to advance the safety, happiness and
prosperity of its people, and to provide for its general welfare, by any and every act of
legislation, which it may deem ... conducive to these ends").
41. See, e.g., Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Inst. Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 61 (2006)
(citing W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)) (discussing the
unconstitutionality of a state law requiring schoolchildren to salute the flag and recite
the Pledge of Allegiance and a state law requiring New Hampshire drivers to display
the state motto on their license plate, and emphasizing that these laws improperly
dictate the content of speech).
42. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Tex. Dep't of Transp., 264 F.3d 493, 506 (5th Cir.
2001) (explaining that a regulation "prohibit[ing] advertising the sale of motor
vehicles by licensed dealers, a commercial activity lawful in Texas," would be a lawful
regulation under the First Amendment).
43. See, e.g., Nebbia, 291 U.S. at 537 (maintaining that "there can be no doubt that
upon proper occasion and by appropriate measures the state may regulate a business
in any of its aspects, including the prices to be charged for the products or
commodities it sells"); see also Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 567 (2011)
(acknowledging the distinction between regulating speech and conduct); Ford Motor
Co., 264 F.3d at 506 (rejecting the notion that the heightened scrutiny of the First
Amendment is implicated when a merchant simply "infus[es] [its] prohibited conduct
with some element of speech").
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speech without violating the First Amendment.' A law regulating
speech incident to conduct rarely-if ever-poses a constitutional
threat." A law must essentially alter the expressive content at issue for
incidental speech to fall within constitutionally protected territory.'
Since attorneys do not typically litigate the line between speech and
conduct in the simplistic terms of the restaurant hypothetical,
alternative analyses yield more informative ways of measuring whether
speech is regulated independently of, or incident to, conduct. 7
Hence, other case law provides a more instructive framework for
understanding the distinction between laws that regulate speech and
those that regulate conduct. For example, in Rumsfeld v. Forum for
Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc.," a federal statute requiring law
schools to provide military recruiters with the same access to students
as other on-campus recruiters did not violate the First Amendment
even though it implicated the schools' speech." The Court
acknowledged that this statute compelled speech by requiring law
schools to advertise military recruiters in the same manner that they
advertised all other recruiters.so However, the Court asserted that
freedom of speech prohibits the government from mandating what
44. See Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 567 (expounding upon the constitutionality of the
Vermont law at issue, which "[did] not simply have an effect on speech, but [was]
directed at certain content and [was] aimed at particular speakers"); Roark & Hardee
LP v. City of Austin, 522 F.3d 533, 549-50 (5th Cir. 2008) (explaining that a regulation
requiring merchants and employees to "'verbally' request smokers to extinguish
cigarettes or leave the premises" did not violate the First Amendment because the ban
focused on the conduct of the smoker); Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 61-62 (holding that
Congress could deny funding to higher education institutions that did not assist
military recruiters without violating the First Amendment because the institutions were
not prevented from expressing unfavorable views about the military recruiting
programs).
45. See Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 63, 65-66 (reiterating that "burning the American flag
[is] sufficiently expressive to warrant First Amendment protection").
46. See id. at 63 (declaring that a compelled speech violation only exists when "the
complaining speaker's own message [is] affected" by the regulation).
47. See e.g., United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985) ("[A]n incidental
burden on speech is no greater than is essential, and therefore is permissible . .. so
long as the neutral regulation promotes a substantial government interest that would
be achieved less effectively absent the regulation.").
48. 547 U.S. 47 (2006).
49. See id. at 47 (describing university resistance to assist military recruiters on
campus because doing so might seemingly endorse the military's policy on
homosexual service members).
50. Id. at 61-62 (recognizing that if the law schools sent e-mails or posted notices
on behalf of other recruiters, they were required to do so for military recruiters in
order to comply with the Solomon Amendment-even if the schools did not condone
certain military policies).
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people must say-not what they must do-and concluded that the law
at issue purely did the latter."
The Court further recognized that the law did not dictate the
content of the speech involved or restrict the schools from speaking
freely about military policies, and it reasoned that "[n] othing about
recruiting suggests that law schools agree with ... recruiters."" The
Court rebuked the suggestion that requiring a law school to send e-
mails for military recruiters in the same fashion that it sent e-mails for
other recruiters implicated the First Amendment, remarking that such
an imposition would "trivializel[] the freedom protected" in First
Amendmentjurisprudence."
In Roark & Hardee LP v. City of Austin,' the Fifth Circuit came to a
similar conclusion. A group of bar and restaurant owners filed suit to
contest the constitutionality of a "Smoking in Public Places" ordinance
adopted in Austin, Texas." The plaintiffs asserted a First Amendment
violation, arguing that the ordinance "compel[led] them to speak
against their will by" requiring them to verbally request that patrons
"stop smoking and leave the premises."" Relying in part on the
Supreme Court's analysis in Rumsfeld, the Fifth Circuit rejected the
plaintiffs' First Amendment argument, concluding that it trivialized
the freedom of speech. 7
Courts must closely examine "'from a practical standpoint' the
nature of the exact conduct subject to the regulation."" Because it is
important for states to maintain the authority to regulate in the
interests of their citizens, merchants cannot simply "bootstrap
themselves into the heightened scrutiny of the First Amendment ...
by infusing ... prohibited conduct with some element of speech."" In
an attempt to prevent plaintiffs from overstating their First
51. Id. at 59-60.
52. Id. at 65 (citing Bd. of Educ. of Westside Cmty. Schs. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226,
250 (1990) (plurality opinion)) ("We have held that high school students can
appreciate the difference between speech a school sponsors and speech the school
permits because legally required to do so .... Surely students have not lost that ability
by the time they get to law school."); see also Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ.
of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 822-23, 845-46 (1995).
53. Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 62.
54. 522 F.3d 533 (5th Cir. 2008).
55. Id. at 538-39.
56. Id. at 549.
57. Id.; Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 62.
58. Rowell v. Pettijohn, No. A-14-CA-190-LY, 2015 WL 10818660, at *2 (W.D. Tex.
Feb. 4, 2015) (quoting Voting for Am., Inc. v. Steen, 732 F.3d 382, 389-91 (5th Cir.
2013)), affd, 816 F.3d 73 (5th Cir. 2016), vacated, 137 S. Ct. 1431 (2017).
59. Ford Motor Co. v. Tex. Dep't of Transp., 264 F.3d 493, 506 (5th Cir. 2001).
[Vol. 66:14591470
2017] ANTI-SURCHARGE LAWS & MERCHANTS' FREEDOM OF SPEECH .1471
Amendment protections, courts now expect plaintiffs to provide clear
and persuasive displays of how the challenged regulation violates their
free speech rights when they invoke First Amendment protections.'
2. Commerical speech
Even constitutionally protected speech can fall within the purview
of government regulation, depending on the nature of the regulation
and the justifications behind it. In remanding Expressions H to the
Second Circuit," the Supreme Court suggested that the Second Circuit
could consider New York's anti-surcharge law as a regulation on
commercial speech," which, though protected, is a type of speech that
the government can lawfully regulate." By carving out commercial
speech as a subset of expression under the First Amendment, the
Court acknowledges the increased complexity that arises when
business and speech overlap and fuses First Amendment principles
with states' valid interest in regulating business."
The Supreme Court defines commercial speech as "expression
related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its
audience."a This definition serves the speaker's economic interests
and furthers society's goal of assisting consumers by fostering the
fullest dissemination of information possible.' Commercial speech
regulations partially stem from the idea that the speech "occurs in an
area traditionally subject to government regulation."' Though courts
now afford commercial speech First Amendment protections subject
60. Voting for Am. Inc., 732 F.3d at 387-88 (citing Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-
Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 n.5 (1984)) (stating that a party claiming a First
Amendment violation has the burden to prove that the Amendment is implicated).
61. Expressions II, 137 S. Ct. 1144,1146-47 (2017).
62. See supra Section IA.
63. See Ruane, supra note 4, at 15 (pointing to the government's ability to regulate
commercial speech "more than it may regulate fully protected speech").
64. See id. at 14-17 (showing how the Central Hudson four-factor test produces
varied results in practice).
65. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557,
561 (1980) (citing Va. State Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748, 762-63 (1976)); see also Jonathan Weinberg, Note, Constitutional Protection of
Commercial Speech, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 720, 720 n.2 (1982) (articulating the two elements
necessary for the commercial speech doctrine to apply: (1) its content must "promote
the purchasing of goods or services" with (2) the purpose of advancing the speaker's
financial interests).
66. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 561-62.
67. Id. at 561-63.
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to government regulation, courts initially considered commercial
speech unworthy of free speech protections altogether.'
The Court maintained its hardline stance against First Amendment
protection for commercial speech for many years, justifying its denial
of affording protections to commercial speech by considering the
motivations of advertisers rather than the content of the expressions at
stake.' It was more than twenty years before the Court adopted any
precedent that challenged the ban against protecting commercial
speech"o and another ten years before the Court changed its approach
by implementing a balancing test.7 In the wake of this change, the
Court continuously modified the level of protection afforded to
commercial speech" until it decided Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp.
v. Public Service Commission of New York.7 ' The analysis the Court used
in this case remains the standard today.
a. The Central Hudson test
In Central Hudson, an electrical utility company challenged the
constitutionality of a New York regulation that completely banned
promotional advertising.7 ' The ban was a direct response to New
68. Weinberg, supra note 65, at 722; see also Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52,
54 (1942) (elucidating that the Constitution imposes no restraints on commercial
speech and deferring such matters to state legislative judgment).
69. Weinberg, supra note 65, at 722-23.
70. Id. at 723 (arguing that the first crack in the wall against protecting commercial
speech appeared "almost offhandedly" in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254
(1964), when the Court disposed of the argument that an advertisement in The New
York Times constituted commercial speech instead of focusing on the content of the
speech).
71. See Bigelow v. Va., 421 U.S. 809, 826 (1975) (instituting a balancing test that
considered (1) the state interest served by the dissemination of the speech and (2) the
government power advanced by regulation to determine whether commercial speech
warranted First Amendment protections).
72. Compare Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 700-02 (1977), and Va.
State Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 773 (1976)
(establishing protection for commercial speech by creating a rule that prevented states
from completely suppressing truthful and non-misleading advertisements because the
advertisements would not have a harmful effect on consumers or advertisers), with
Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1979) (upholding a statute that banned the
use of trade names because of the significant possibility that advertisers would use
them to mislead the public), and Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 468
(1978) (declaring the constitutionality of and need for prophylactic regulations that
further state interests by protecting the public).
73. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
74. Id. at 559-60 (defining promotional advertising as "advertising intended to
stimulate the purchase of utility services" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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York's inability to meet customer fuel demands during the winter of
1973-1974.7' Three years later, a New York state commission
requested comments to determine whether to continue the ban.7 1
Though Central Hudson opposed the continuance of the ban on First
Amendment grounds, the Commission extended it into the next
year.77 In deciding the case, the Supreme Court emphasized that the
regulation restricted only commercial speech and articulated a four-
part test to determine whether the regulation was constitutional.7 ' The
Central Hudson test evaluated (1) whether the speech concerns lawful
activity and is not misleading, (2) whether the government's asserted
interest is substantial,"o (3) whether the regulation directly advances
the government interest, and (4) whether the regulation is more
extensive than necessary to serve that interest.8 '
While Central Hudson articulated instructive guidelines, lower courts
accepted the decision with a dose of skepticism and feared that it
afforded too much discretion to courts." Nonetheless, the Central
Hudson test remains the Court's accepted standard for determining
whether commercial speech is constitutionally regulated and serves as
an integral component of anti-surcharge litigation.8 1
B. Understanding Anti-Surcharge Laws: The Federal Backdrop, the Circuit
Split, and the Supreme Court
While understanding the nature of First Amendment protections
and the purpose of allowing restrictions on some speech-namely
commercial speech-is critical to understanding the context of anti-
75. Id. at 559.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 566.
79. This prong of the test aims to determine whether the First Amendment
protects the expression in the first place. Id. If the expression is not constitutionally
protected, it is unnecessary to continue the evaluation because there can be no First
Amendment violation in the regulation of an unprotected expression. Id.
80. See id. At this point, the Court clarified that the first two inquiries must yield
positive answers in order to advance to the third prong of the test. Id.
8 1. Id.
82. See Weinberg, supra note 65, at 728-30.
83. See Rowell v. Pettijohn, 816 F.3d 73, 79 (5th Cir. 2016) (noting the Court's
traditional use of Central Hudson's four-prong test when analyzing commercial speech
cases), vacated, 137 S. CL 1431 (2017); Dana's R.R. Supply v. Att'y Gen. of Fla., 807 F.3d
1235, 1249 (11th Cir. 2015) (same), rehearing denied en banc, 809 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir.
2016), cert. denied sub nom. Bondi v. Dana's R.R. Supply, 137 S. Ct. 1452 (2017);
Expressions I, 808 F.3d 118, 130 (2d. Cir. 2015) (same), vacated, 137 S. Ct. 1144 (2017).
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surcharge laws, understanding the root of the laws and the layout of
their litigation is equally important. Within the split among the three
circuit courts that analyzed the constitutionality of the state-level anti-
surcharge laws, each opinion first discussed the origins of the law: a
lapsed federal scheme developed in the 1970s and 1980s. The courts
interpreted the weight and meaning behind this scheme in different
ways, but the Supreme Court's decision in Expressions II ultimately
qualified the litigation in each circuit court.
1. The Truth in Lending Act
State anti-surcharge laws are rooted in a federal statutory scheme
that emerged in the 1970s.' Regulations that eventually evolved into
anti-surcharge laws first took shape with the 1974 amendments to the
Truth in Lending Act ("the Act"), which prevented credit card
companies from contracting with merchants to prohibit discounts for
cash or other non-credit card purchases." Before this amendment,
credit card companies often followed such a practice to bar merchants
from offering discounts on non-card transactions and imposing
surcharges on card transactions.'
The 1976 amendments to the Act only banned merchants from
imposing surcharges; merchants could still legally provide discounts
for non-card purchases.8 7 The Act provided that "[n]o seller in any
sales transaction may impose a surcharge on a cardholder who elects
to use a credit card in lieu of payment by cash, check, or similar
means";" the Act also defined "discount"' and "surcharge."' In 1981,
Congress once again amended the Act-this time to define "regular
84. See Rowell, 816 F.3d at 76-77 (recounting the history of the federal anti-
surcharge law that drove Texas to enact its own anti-surcharge law); Expressions I, 808
F.3d at 123 (outlining the federal anti-surcharge laws that started in 1974 and ended
in 1981).
85. 15 U.S.C. § 1666f(a) (2017) (announcing that "the card issuer may not, by'
contract, or otherwise, prohibit any .. . seller from offering a discount to a cardholder
to induce the cardholder to pay by cash, check, or similar means rather than use a
credit card").
86. Rowel4 816 F.3d at 76.
87. Id.
88. Pub. L. No. 94-222, § 3, 90 Stat. 197 (1976).
89. 15 U.S.C. § 160 2(q) ("The term 'discount' as used in section 1666f of this title
means a reduction made from the regular price. The term 'discount' as used in section
1666f of this title shall not mean a surcharge.").
90. § 1602(r) ("The term 'surcharge' as used in this section and section 1666f of
this title means any means of increasing the regular price to a cardholder which is not
imposed upon customers paying by cash, check, or similar means.").
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price"" to "further distinguish between 'surcharge' and 'discount'" and
provide clarity as to the kinds of pricing schemes allowed under the law."
Despite twice renewing the surcharge ban, Congress let it expire on
February 27, 1984." Eleven states subsequently enacted their own laws
prohibiting credit card surcharges-some of which have sparked the
anti-surcharge litigation at issue-and the "operative language" of the
state statutes effectively mimics the old federal surcharge ban.' The
three courts forming the circuit split on whether anti-surcharge laws
implicated free speech-the Second, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits-
considered this federal history in determining whether the state laws
violated merchants' First Amendment protections." The Supreme
Court in Expressions II also recognized the federal regulatory history
when it noted that the New York anti-surcharge law adopted "almost
verbatim" the federal language.' Despite the connection to the
federal scheme, the Court concluded that because New York failed to
provide clarifying definitions within its law, the statute's wording
remained open to at least three interpretations.97 Similarly, though
the three circuit court decisions-from the Second Circuit in
Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman (Expressions 1) ," the Eleventh
Circuit in Dana's Railroad Supply, and the Fifth Circuit in Rowell v.
91. § 1602(y) ("[T]he tag or posted price charged for the property or service if a
single price is tagged or posted, or the price charged for the property or service when
payment is made by use of. . . a credit card if either (1) no price is tagged or posted,
or (2) two prices are tagged or posted, one of which is charged when payment is made
by use of... a credit card and the other when payment is made by use of cash, check,
or similar means.").
92. Rowell v. Pettijohn, 816 F.3d 73, 76 (5th Cir. 2016), vacated, 137 S. Ct. 1431
(2017).
93. Expressions I, 808 F.3d 118, 124 (2d. Cir. 2015), vacated, 137 S. Ct. 1144 (2017).
94. Id.; see infra Part III (discussing the litigation surrounding the state laws).
95. See generally Rowell, 816 F.3d at 76 (addressing the history of the Truth in
Lending Act as a precursor to state-itnposed regulation); Dana's R.R. Supply v. Att'y
Gen. of Fla., 807 F.3d 1235, 1249 (11th Cir. 2015) (noting the use of Central Hudson's
four-prong test to adjudicate a commercial speech claim), rehearing denied en banc, 809
F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2016), cert.. denied sub nom. Bondi v. Dana's R.R. Supply, 137 S. Ct.
1452 (2017); Expressions I, 808 F.3d at 123-24 (highlighting the credit surcharge
legislation that led to state level credit regulations).
96. Expressions II, 137 S. Ct. 1144, 1154 (2017) (Sotomayor,J., concurring).
97. See id. (observing that one could read the statute either "in line with its plain
text," "in line with the lapsed federal ban," or "more broadly"); accord infra note 178
and accompanying text.
98. 808 F.3d 118 (2d. Cir. 2015), vacated, 137 S. Ct. 1144 (2017).
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Pettiohn-all acknowledged the influence of the federal statutory
scheme, they promulgated distinct interpretations of anti-surcharge laws.
2. How the Circuit Courts analyzed anti-surcharge laws
a. Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman
In Expressions I, the Second Circuit held that New York's anti-
surcharge law was a regulation of conduct, not speech, and therefore
did not violate the First Amendment.oo The case was based upon the
claims of five New York businesses and their owners and managers who
brought suit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New
York."o' The plaintiffs claimed that section 518 of the New York
General Business Law, which is an anti-surcharge law, violated the Free
Speech Clause of the First Amendment and was void for vagueness
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.1 02
The conflict in Expressions I centered around the plaintiffs' desire to
impose a "surcharge" on credit card users'os and the New York law's
ban on surcharges for these transactions."1' The Second Circuit
acknowledged the apparent similarities between imposing a surcharge
and providing a discount, but it noted that their differences led "to a
series of efforts by both credit-card companies and legislators. to
prohibit credit-card surcharges specifically."10 The Second Circuit
considered consumer reactions to pricing schemes'" and acknowledged
the potential risks and benefits that anti-surcharge laws pose, implying
that the laws may provide overarching benefits to consumers. 10 7
99. 816 F.3d 73 (5th Cir. 2016), affg No. A-14-CA-190-LY, 2015 WL 10818660, at
*1 (W.D. Tex. Feb 4, 2015), vacated, 137 S. Ct. 1431 (2017).
100. See Expressions I, 808 F.3d at 130.
101. See id. at 121, 122 n.1.
102. Id. at 122.
103. Id.
104. See N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 518 (McKinney 1984), which states:
No seller in any sales transaction may impose a surcharge on a holder who
elects to use a credit card in lieu of payment-by cash, check, or similar means.
Any seller who violates the provisions of this section shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor punishable by a fine not to exceed five hundred dollars or a
term of imprisonment up to one year, or both.
105. Expressions I, 808 F.3d at 122.
106. Id. at 122-23 (describing the psychological phenomenon of "loss aversion").
In this case, loss aversion is the idea that applying surcharges is more effective in
discouraging credit-card usage than providing discounts for alternative behavior. Id.
107. Id. at 123 (suggesting that "surcharges will tend to exceed the amount
necessary for the seller to recoup its swipe fees, meaning that sellers will effectively be
able to extract ... profits from credit-card users"). Cash discounts do not pose the
1476 [Vol. 66:1459
2017] ANTI-SURCHARGE lAWS & MERCHANTS' FREEDOM OF SPEECH 1477
The Second Circuit also described the federal statutory
development'08 that informed subsequent state laws' and asserted
that the New York law was one such law based on the Act. 1 0 Yet the
New York law differed significantly from the previous federal law
because it did not include the explicit definitions found in the original
federal counterpart.1 1 Yet when the New York legislature enacted the
law, the legislature deemed it a necessary replacement of the lapsed
federal scheme and intended it to prevent consumers from being subject
to the whims of unpredictable and "dubious" merchant practices."
The Second Circuit noted that while all plaintiffs desired to impose
a higher price on customers paying with credit cards, only Expressions
Hair Design had in place a dual-pricing scheme,. or a pricing scheme
that charges different prices depending on the method of payment."
However, Expressions Hair Design expressed a clear fear of being able
to effectively communicate its pricing scheme without violating the
relevant statute."' Further, all plaintiffs expressed a desire to
characterize higher amounts for credit card transactions as
"surcharges."115 In its response, the Second Circuit acknowledged that
it found that section 518 burdens speech by "draw[ing] the line
between prohibited 'surcharges' and permissible 'discounts' based on
words and labels, rather than economic realities.""'
The Second Circuit's analysis addressed the plaintiffs' wish to
implement pricing schemes prohibited by the statute.' Yet the court
criticized the plaintiffs because all attempts to demonstrate section
518's unconstitutionality referenced "other, hypothetical pricing
same risks "because merchants will not set the amount of the discount higher than the
marginal cost of credit." However, surcharges might provide an opportunity for
dishonest sellers to profit at the consumers' expense by tacking additional charges on
at the end of a sale. Id.
108. See supra Section B.1 for a discussion of the federal statutory history.
109. Expressions I, 808 F.3d at 123-24.
110. Id.at 124.
111. See id. (detailing that the original federal law defined "surcharge," "discount,"
and "regular price"); see also supra Section II.A.
112. Expressions I, 808 F.3d at 124-25.
113. Id. at 129.
114. See id. (noting the plaintiff's hesitation to charge different prices for card-
paying customers and cash-paying customers for fear of invoking section 518's
statutory provisions).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 131 (quoting Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 975 F. Supp. 2d
430, 444 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)).
117. Id. at 129 (explaining that "section 518 clearly prohibits" the plaintiffs' desired
pricing schemes).
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schemes that they neither currently employ ... nor claim they would
employ but for [s]lection 518.""s Further, the court clearly stated that
a statute's constitutionality may only be assessed as applied to
hypothetical situations when the plaintiffs assert a facial attack on the
statute," 9 and it described the two kinds of facial challenges generally
available in First Amendment cases.120
While the court established that there might be uncertainty as to the
scope of the plaintiffs' First Amendment challenge, this understanding
did not affect the court's analysis.'21 The Second Circuit held that the
statute did not violate the First Amendment because (1) prices do not
qualify as "speech" within the meaning of the First Amendment,
regardless of the fact that they are necessarily communicated through
language; (2) it follows that if prohibiting certain prices does not
implicate the First Amendment, then prohibiting certain relationships
between prices also does not implicate the First Amendment; and (3)
section 518 does not, by its terms, prohibit merchants from referring
to credit-cash price differentials as credit-card surcharges or from
engaging in advocacy related to such surcharges. The regulation
simply prohibits the actual imposition of surcharges.'22 The Second
Circuit concluded that all that New York's section 518 regulates is the
difference between the number that a merchant puts on a price sticker
and the ultimate amount that it charges credit card customers. 2 1
b. Dana's Railroad Supply v. Attorney General of Florida
In Dana's Railroad Supply, the Eleventh Circuit produced an analysis
and conclusion far different from the Expressions I opinion when it
scrutinized an anti-surcharge law that was substantially similar to the
118. Id.
119. Id. (citing Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442,
450 (2008)).
120. Id. (quoting Wash. State Grange, 552 U.S. at 449, 449 n.6) (naming the two
challenges as "(1) 'that the law is unconstitutional in all of its applications,' or (2) that
'a substantial number of its applications are unconstitutional judged in relation to the
statute's plainly legitimate sweep'").
121. Id. at 130.
122. The "central flaw in [the plaintiffs'] argument," according to the court, was
that they insisted on equating the actual imposition of a surcharge ("to charge an
additional amount above the sticker price to ... credit-card customers") with the
words describing that pricing scheme (that "the term 'credit-card surcharge'" is
inherently attached to the prohibited behavior described in the statute). Id. at 131-
32.
123. Id. at 132.
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New York law in scope and application."' The Eleventh Circuit relied
upon an imagined scenario to hold not only that an anti-surcharge law
merited a First Amendment analysis, but also that it unlawfully
restricted speech."' In Dana's Railroad Supply, four small businesses
brought suit in the Middle District of Florida after receiving cease-and-
desist letters following each merchant's violation of the state's anti-
surcharge law.2 6 Each business wished to charge different prices for
credit card and non-credit card transactions, and each business wished
to express the price difference "as an additional amount for credit-card
use rather than a lesser amount for paying in cash."'27
The district court held that the law was a regulation on economic
affairs-not speech-and as such subjected it to rational basis review."
Finding that the law passed rational basis review, it declined to apply
any level of First Amendment scrutiny and instead upheld the anti-
surcharge law.1' The Eleventh Circuit on appeal, however,
disregarded the district court's analysis and employed its hypothetical
restaurant scenario to determine that the statute raised First
Amendment concerns.1 3 0  As a result, the court turned to the
commercial speech analysis and applied Central Hudson's intermediate
scrutiny test.' 3 ' It subsequently held that the law failed intermediate
scrutiny132 and therefore directly restricted speech by merely
attempting to control conduct in response to the speech. 33
In a pointed dissent, ChiefJudge Edward Earl Carnes focused on the
majority's failure to acknowledge and analyze the narrow language of
the statute.'13 In doing so, he argued that the majority had "rewritten
124. See Dana's R.R. Supply v. Att'y Gen. of Fla., 807 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2015)
(holding Florida's anti-surcharge statute constitutional), rev'g Dana's R.R. Supply v.
Bondi, No. 4:14CV134-RH/CAS 2014 WL 11189176, at *1 (N.D. Fla. Sept. 2, 2014).
125. Id. at 1246.
126. Id. at 1239.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1240.
129. Id. at 1240-41.
130. Id. at 1245 (analogizing the statute at issue with a hypothetical statute that bars
restaurants from selling "half-empty beverages" but authorizes restaurants to sell "half-
full beverages," and concluding that such a statute would clearly regulate speech rather
than economic affairs).
131. Id. at 1249; see also supra Section I.A.
132. Dana's R Supply, 807 F.3d at 1249-51.
133. Id. at 1251 (holding the statute unconstitutional because it regulates the
language that merchants may use to convey their prices rather than the prices
themselves).
134. Id. at 1251-52 (Carnes,J., dissenting).
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[the statute] with a great big First Amendment bullseye on it.""'
Further, Carnes criticized the opinion for developing "a fatal
constitutional flaw," and argued that the plaintiffs actually brought a
facial challenge without claiming that the statute is overbroad.1" A
facial challenge not based on overbreadth can only succeed by
demonstrating that there is "'no set of circumstances' . . . where the
law could be validly applied[,]" and Carnes concluded the plaintiffs
failed to do so in that case."'
c. Rowell v. Pettijohn
In Rowell v. Pettifohn, the Fifth Circuit relied upon Expressions I to
conclude that Texas's anti-surcharge law did not violate the First
Amendment. In that case, a group of Texas merchants claimed that
an anti-surcharge law, which penalized characterizing prices as a
"surcharge" and simultaneously allowed for discounts on non-credit
card transactions, violated free speech rights.' Conversely, the Texas
Office of Consumer Credit argued that the statute was a lawful economic-
pricing regulation that did not implicate the First Amendment. 1 9
The Fifth Circuit considered many aspects of the case before coming
to its conclusion, including the federal history that led to the Texas
law.14 0 The court acknowledged that the district court dismissed the
challenge at hand for failure to state a claim, denying a preliminary
injunction, 14 and it then considered the circuit split resulting from the
decisions of the Second and Eleventh Circuits, tracing and comparing
the analyses of each case before arriving at the beginning of its own
analysis.14 2 This trail led the court to conclude that similar to the cases
in the Second and Eleventh Circuits, the merchants in this action
adequately conveyed that "they were presently chilled from implementing
135. Id. at 1252.
136. Id. at 1253-54.
137. Id. at 1254.
138. See Rowell v. Pettijohn, 816 F.3d 73, 75-76 (5th Cir. 2016), vacated, 137 S. Ct.
1431 (2017).
139. Id. at 76.
140. Id. (detailing the "substantial federal-law backdrop" stemming from the 1974
amendments to the Truth in Lending Act to the expiration of the relevant provision
in 1984).
141. Id. at 77 (citing Rowell v. Pettijohn, No. A-14-CA-190-LY, 2015 WL 3637101
(W.D. Tex. 4 Feb. 2015)).
142. Id. at 76-80.
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their preferred pricing scheme, and. . . had standing based on a
credible fear [that Texas's law] would be enforced against them.""
The Fifth Circuit addressed the wide latitude afforded to states in
regulating their economic activities.'" It recognized that states are
able to adopt any economic policy deemed reasonably necessary to
promote the welfare of the state and that "the First Amendment does
not prevent restrictions directed at, commerce or conduct from
imposing incidental burdens on speech.""' The court quickly
concluded that, in line with state economic policy, the law regulated
conduct as opposed to speech, and the First Amendment was therefore
not implicated."' The court found that the law ensured that
merchants did not impose charges above the regular price for
customers paying with credit cards." 7
The Fifth Circuit's conclusion derived from the text of the Texas
law-which the court considered analogous to that of the New York
law in Expressions P"-and from the ability of the anti-surcharge law to
fit neatly into the place of the lapsed federal scheme."' Further, the
court supported its conclusion with the legislative history's indication
that Congress enacted the law to regulate conduct by prohibiting
charges above a "normal" price.'" Therefore, the merchants' argument
that the law regulated speech rather than conduct was "unavailing." 15 1
In concluding this, the court relied on the Second Circuit's holding
in Expressions l and aligned its analysis with that of its sister court. In
the Fifth Circuit's view, the Eleventh Circuit's analysis "overlook[ed]
differences in the economic activity" that resulted in an incorrect
analysis.15' However, the Supreme Court soon questioned the Fifth
and Second Circuits' analyses by holding that New York's anti-
surcharge law is a regulation of speech.
143. Id. at 80 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Expressions I, 803 F.3d
118, 127 (2d. Cir. 2015)) (citing Dana's R.R. Supply v. Att'y Gen. of Fla., 807 F.3d 1235,
1241 (11th Cir. 2015), rehearing denied en banc, 809 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2016), cert.
denied sub nom. Bondi v. Dana's R.R. Supply, 137 S. Ct. 1452 (2017)).
144. Id. (quoting Howard v. City of Garland, 917 F.2d 898, 901 (5th Cir. 1990))
("States are accorded wide latitude in the regulation of their local economies under
their police powers.").
145. Id. (quoting Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 567 (2011)).
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 81.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 81-82 (citing Hearings on Tex. H.B. 1558 Before the House Comm. on Fin.
Insts., 69th Leg. Reg. Sess. (Tex. 1985)).
151. Id. at 82.
152. Id. at 83.
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3. How the Supreme Court analyzed anti-surcharge laws
The Supreme Court took on the anti-surcharge law circuit split when
it granted certiorari to Expressions I In a fractured but unanimous
opinion, the Supreme Court in Expressions Hlruled that NewYork's anti-
surcharge law regulates speech."' ChiefJustice Roberts delivered the
majority opinion, detailing the practical implications of the law1" and
asserting that the two issues of the case were whether the law regulated
speech and whether it violated the First Amendment." 5 As in the
circuit court cases, Roberts began his opinion by providing the history
of anti-surcharge laws, tracing their derivation to the Truth in Lending
Act's 1976 amendments" 6 and making specific note of the definitions
provided through the Act.1 7 According to Roberts, the definitions
provided one major advantage for the law: they demonstrated that "a
merchant could violate the surcharge ban only by posting a single price
and charging credit card users more than that posted price."' 8 Before
introducing the petitioners, Roberts noted the expiration of the
federal bans, the birth of the state legislation, and the history of the
credit card contract prohibitions on swipe fees."
Curiously, Roberts's opinion emphasized the New York merchant
petitioners' arguments that they were not responsible for the higher
credit card prices and that the credit card companies, not the
merchants, were "the bad guys."1" Roberts also explained the
procedural posture of Expressions II, indicating that the Second Circuit
relied on Supreme Court precedent to determine that price
regulations limit conduct, not speech, and that the anti-surcharge law
therefore did not violate the First Amendment.6 ' He noted that the
Second Circuit abstained from the merits of the constitutional
153. Expressions II, 137 S. Ct. 1144, 1150-51 (2017).
154. Id. at 1146 ("Each time a customer pays for an item with a credit card, the
merchant selling that item must pay a transaction fee to the credit card issuer. Some
merchants . .. pass on the fees to customers who use [credit cards]. One method of
achieving those ends is through differential pricing-charging credit card users more
than customers using cash.").
155. Id.
156. Id. at 1147-48 (discussing the 1976 amendments' bar on credit card
surcharges).
157. Id. (discussing how discount and surcharge were defined in the 1974
amendments while the 1981 amendments incorporated a definition of regular price
to provide increased clarity on the statute's pricing requirements).
158. Id. at 1147.
159. Id. at 1148.
160. Id. at 1149.
161. Id. at 1149-50.
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question beyond the single-sticker price context'62 because the federal
laws only applied to single-sticker price regimes and the merchants did
not clearly show that New York's law had a broader reach than the
federal law.1 3 The merchants maintained they were only bringing an
as-applied challenge against New York's law," and Roberts concluded
that this challenge limited the Court's own review to whether the
statute was unconstitutional as applied to the pricing scheme that the
merchants wished to employ.'"'
Roberts and the Court adopted the Second Circuit's definition of
surcharge'" to conclude that the New York law barred the merchants'
desired pricing regime.'6 7 He then asserted that the law "[was] not a
typical price regulation" because it does not tell merchants about the
amount they may collect; rather, the law attempts to regulate "how
sellers may communicate their prices."'" Roberts agreed with the
Second Circuit that the law regulated the relationship between the
sticker price and the price charged to credit card users, but he did not
conclude that the law was a mere price regulation.' As such, he
determined that the law regulated speech and remanded the case for
the Second Circuit to analyze whether the law is either a valid
commercial speech regulation or a valid disclosure requirement.1ve
Justice Stephen Breyer wrote the first concurrence of the opinion,
agreeing that the statute regulated speech, but arguing that the correct
inquiry is whether the law "affects an interest that the First Amendment
protects.""' Breyer asserted that for the statute to pass constitutional
muster, the law need only be reasonably related to the state's interest
162. Id. at 1149 (describing single sticker pricing as where merchants post one price
and would like to charge more to customers who pay by credit card).
163. Id. at 1148.
164. Id. at 1149 (discussing how the Second Circuit interpreted the merchants'
statutory challenge as both a facial attack and an as-applied attack).
165. Id. (describing the pricing regime sought by petitioners: "posting a cash price
and an additional credit card surcharge, expressed either as a percentage surcharge
or a 'dollars-and-cents' additional amount").
166. Id. at 1149-50 (indicating that the lower court defined surcharge as "an
additional amount above the seller's regular price," and that the Court had to adopt
the definition because it was unable to dismiss it as "clearly wrong").
167. Id. at 1151.
168. Id.
169. Id. (holding that because the law regulates the way in which prices are
communicated instead of just the prices themselves, it cannot be a mere price
regulation).
170. Id. at 1151-52. The Court then concluded that the merchants' additional
challenge-that the law was vague as applied to them-was dismissed. Id.
171. Id. at 1152 (Breyer,J., concurring).
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in having commercial speakers disclose factual information to
consumers.' 72  Breyer's premise was that the more important
determination of the case is understanding what approach to apply to
the law, not merely identifying a regulation as one of speech rather
than as one of conduct.17 ' He concluded by emphasizing that the
statute is unclear and that it is a matter of state law to decipher its
meaning; remanding the case was therefore correct.174
Justice Sonia Sotomayor, joined by Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr.,
provided a more complex concurrence, asserting that the Court
should have remanded the case to the Second Circuit with specific
instructions to certify the case to the New York Court of Appeals for a
complete interpretation of the statute.7 Sotomayor argued that due
to the various interpretations of the New York statute,'7 ' the petitioners
required a clear interpretation to resolve their challenge.17 7 Sotomayor
further argued that the Second Circuit's interpretation of the statute
would be non-binding because state courts, not federal courts, have the
final word on the interpretation of state statutes.17 1 Sotomayor ultimately
concluded that the Court's decision not to certify was an abuse of its
discretion.' 79 However, Sotomayor noted that the majority did not
preclude the Second Circuit from choosing certification on remand and
suggested that certification would be the correct path.so8
Ultimately, the Court only clarified the first portion of the maze:
that New York's anti-surcharge law regulates speech, not conduct.' 8 1
172. Id.
173. Id. (finding that "determining the proper approach is typically more important
than trying to distinguish 'speech' from 'conduct"').
174. Id. at 1153 (concluding, also, that it would be helpful for the Second Circuit to
ask the New York Court of Appeals to clarify the nature of the obligation imposed by
the statute).
175. Id. (Sotomayor,J., concurring).
176. Id. at 1153-54 (arguing that the statute could be interpreted as a prohibition
on charging credit card customers more money than other customers; preventing a
merchant from displaying only the cash price and then charging a different credit
price; or restricting the way that a merchant may characterize a higher credit price,
despite being able to charge a higher price).
177. Id. at 1155-56.
178. Id. at 1156 (discussing the possibility of abstention, but describing it as "a blunt
instrument" and arguing in favor of certification).
179. See id. at 1158-59 (summarizing that the Second Circuit's failure to provide
"persuasive downsides" to certifying the case reflected an abuse of discretion).
180. See id. at 1159 (proffering the solution of vacating the Second Circuit's
judgment and remanding the case with instructions to certify it in the New York Court
of Appeals).
181. Id. at 1158-59 (concluding that the Second Circuit offered no decision as to
the constitutionality of New York's section 518).
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The Second Circuit will act under the Court's direction on remand;
however, if it deems the law a regulation on commercial speech, it
could either follow the Eleventh Circuit to find that New York's anti-
surcharge law does not pass even an intermediate level of First
Amendment scrutiny, or recognize the state interests at stake to find
that the law survives Central Hudson.
II. THE PROBLEM WITH HYPOTHETICALS
Taking into account the variety of ways that courts have interpreted
anti-surcharge laws-including the Eleventh Circuit's imagined
restaurant scenario-consider a revised version of the introductory
hypothetical. Suppose that while drafting the hypothetical restaurant
mandate, Florida's legislators realize courts will likely invalidate the
glass half-full scheme as a violation of free speech."' Rather than move
forward with the plan, they re-draft the legislation in a way that is
constitutionally permissible but still regulates the restaurant industry
to restore Florida's reputation. The goal is to prevent restaurant
owners from pouring drinks too conservatively, while allowing them to
safeguard resources by incentivizing customers to purchase half-full
drinks. Recognizing the wide latitude afforded to states in regulating
business conduct and its substantial interest in saving both its
restaurant and tourism markets, Florida devises a three-part law to
regulate commercial speech, effective immediately.
The revised hypothetical statute provides that (1) no restaurant may
impose a surcharge on customers who request that restaurants pour
their drinks to the maximum capacity of the glass; (2) restaurants may,
however, provide a discount for customers who request restaurants
pour their drinks less than halfway to capacity; and (3) a surcharge is
defined as any additional amount that increases the charge to a
customer who requests a fully poured drink. Violation of the law
results in the possibility of fifty days imprisonment or a $500 fine.
While Florida is confident that this new law will help restore the
dining industry, restaurant owners are unhappy with the change. They
wish to charge higher prices to customers ordering drinks filled to
capacity and lower prices to customers ordering drinks filled less than
halfway. More specifically, they wish to express the price as an
additional charge for a fully poured beverage-not a discount for a
partially poured beverage. They file suit against the state, alleging that
the law violates the First Amendment by creating an unjustified restriction
on speech. These challenges now task Florida courts with assessing the
182. See supra note 1 and accompanying text for a discussion of this hypothetical.
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new law and deciding whether it is a lawful regulation of commercial
speech or an unconstitutional violation of the First Amendment.
However unlikely the hypothetical, this revised version looks much
more like the anti-surcharge law litigated in the Eleventh Circuit."' It
is also clear that there is a higher level of complexity in this
hypothetical than in the glass half-full scenario on which the Eleventh
Circuit relied.1 4 Moreover, this new hypothetical highlights the two
most significant shortcomings of the Eleventh Circuit's analysis:
(1) that its argument relied too heavily on an over-simplified
hypothetical; and (2) that as a result, it mischaracterized the law to
conclude that it did not serve a significant government interest and
could not survive intermediate scrutiny.' Florida's law failed the
Eleventh Circuit's intermediate scrutiny analysis because it analyzed
the law through this inherently flawed lens.
A. The Eleventh Circuit relied too heavily on its hypothetical, arbitrarily
construing a First Amendment violation
To avoid potential confusion, the Eleventh Circuit began its First
Amendment analysis by examining what the Florida statute did not do,
concluding that it did not ban merchants from engaging in dual-
pricing or prohibit merchants from imposing bait-and-switch
schemes. 86 The court's next conclusion-that the statute "target[ed]
expression alone"-ended its First Amendment analysis quickly and by
default."' The court decided this through use of the previously
described hypothetical that equated surcharges to negative
183. The Florida anti-surcharge statute provides in part: "(1) A seller ... may not
impose a surcharge ... for electing to use a credit card .... A surcharge is any
additional amount imposed at the time of a sale ... by the seller or lessor that increases
the charge ... for the privilege of using a credit card to make payment .... This
section does not apply to the offering of a discount for the purpose of inducing
payment by cash, check, or other means not involving the use of a credit card, if the
discount is offered to all prospective customers." Fla. Stat. § 501.0117 (2016).
184. See supra Section I.B.2.b.
185. See Dana's R.R. Supply v. Att'y Gen. of Fla., 807 F.3d 1235, 1249 (11th Cir.
2015), rehearing denied en banc, 809 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2016), cert. denied sub nom.
Bondi v. Dana's R.R. Supply, 137 S. Ct. 1452 (2017).
186. Id. at 1243-44 (examining alternative statutory aims that could demonstrate
both a regulation of conduct and a significant government interest).
187. Id. at 1245.
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discounts,"e and the court then subjected the statute to "the robust
protections of the First Amendment."1 "
At face value, the Eleventh Circuit's analysis was problematic
because of the simplicity of its hypotheticals. The glass half-full
mandate diluted the issue to an extent that overlooked the possibility
that the statute regulated conduct and contradicted the court's earlier
declaration that the First Amendment issue was likely to spark
confusion.!o On a structural level, the analysis was problematic
because it diminished the statute's intent from the get-go. It
mischaracterized the law as one that discriminated "on the basis of the
speech's content, the identity of the speaker, and the message being
expressed," which conditioned the law for failure under Central
Hudson."' Further, the Eleventh Circuit cherry picked from the
district court's opinion to bolster its own position."' It repeatedly
quoted the district court's assertion that while there were several
possible state interests that would justify the regulation, none were
"compelling.""' However, the Eleventh Circuit blatantly ignored the
district court's concession that the law would still survive intermediate
scrutiny under Central Hudson."' This selective extrapolation of
favorable facts and legal reasoning further demonstrates how the
court's decision was a conclusive product of its own making rather than
an informed result of legal analysis. The lack of an even-handed
approach suggests that the reasoning leading to its First Amendment
violation was flawed.
The Eleventh Circuit's reliance on hypotheticals also made it an
easier target for the dissent, which argued that the majority crafted its
own "statute-killing" definition of surcharge despite the statute's
188. Id. (proposing that there was no real-world difference in considering whether
a copy of Plato's Republic-sold either for $30 cash or $32 credit-means that a
customer incurs a $2 surcharge or receives a $2 discount).
189. Id. at 1245-46 (using the hypothetical "[tio more fully understand why the
statute restricts speech, rather than regulates conduct").
190. See id. at 1243, 1245-46 (asserting at the outset of the opinion that Florida's
surcharge law does not ban dual-pricing, and later concluding that the law only
prohibits implementing price choices).
191. Id. at 1239.
192. See, e.g., id. at 1249-50 (asserting that the district court's hypothesis about the
state's purported interest was more concrete than that offered by either party).
193. Id.
194. Dana's RR. Supply v. Bondi, No. 4:14CV134-RH/CAS 2014 WL 11189176, at
*2 (N.D. Fla. Sept. 2, 2014) ("[I]f this were viewed as a restriction on commercial
speech, the outcome would be the same; this statute passes muster under the
commercial-speech standards imposed in cases like Central Hudson").
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narrow definition of the term."' Chief Judge Carnes began his
dissenting First Amendment analysis by looking to the language of the
statute."o He emphasized that the Florida statute defined a surcharge
as "any additional amount imposed at the time of a sale ... that
increases the charge . .. for the privilege of using a credit card to make
a payment,"'97 and he argued that the majority's reasoning only made
sense under its own misreading of the statute.19" Moreover, Carnes
highlighted that if the majority were to apply the narrow statutory
definition of surcharge imposed by the statute itself, the majority's
constitutional analysis would crumble." He noted that the majority's
defective statutory interpretation was consistent with its unwavering
attachment to the hypothetical restaurant scenario because both
hinged on extraneous details construed by the court.2 00
Despite the comfort with which the Eleventh Circuit applied its
hypotheticals, the Second Circuit is unlikely to employ such conclusive
reasoning when it reviews Expressions II on remand. When it initially
heard the case, the Second Circuit criticized the plaintiffs because
throughout litigation, they relied on hypothetical pricing schemes that
they did not employ and did not wish to implement.o' Similar to the
imagined facts of the hypothetical crafted by the Eleventh Circuit, the
plaintiffs' proffer of hypotheticals in Expressions Istray from the actual
facts of the case. In Expressions 1,. the plaintiffs articulated irrelevant
hypotheticals by crafting pricing schemes that they did not seek to
employ, and the Eleventh Circuit posed a hypothetical that simplified
195. Id. at 1251 (Carnes, C.J., dissenting).
196. Id. (discussing different interpretations of the term "surcharge"). For a similar
statutory analysis, see Expressions I, 808 F.3d 118 (2d. Cir. 2015), vacated, 137 S. Ct. 1144
(2017).
197. Dana'sR.R Supply, 807 F.3d at 1251 (Carnes, C.J., dissenting) (citing N.Y. Gen.
Bus. § 518 (McKinney 1984)).
198. Id. at 1252 (Carnes, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Stansell v. Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colom., 704 F.3d 910, 915 (11th Cir. 2013)) (noting that the majority was
wrong to reject the statute's narrow definition of surcharge in favor of its own
colloquial understanding of the word, and asserting that when a statutory definition
exists the court "must follow the well-established and common sense principle that
'statutory definitions control the meaning of a statute's terms"').
199. Id. (expressing bewilderment that the majority defined a surcharge as a
negative discount and a discount as a negative surcharge in favor of reading the plain
language of the statute).
200. Id. (describing the bullseye strategy of the majority opinion).
. 201. See Expressions I for a similar statutory analysis. 808 F.3d 118, 129 (2d. Cir.
2015), vacated, 137 S. Ct. 1144 (2017).
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the First Amendment issue to an unrecognizable extent.20 2 Because
the Second Circuit already demonstrated the futility of posing
irrelevant scenarios in the absence of an argument that challenges the
facial validity of a statute,203 it should not follow or be persuaded by the
Eleventh Circuit's analysis.
III. RE-INTERPRETING EXPRESSIONS AS A REGULATION ON SPEECH
When the Supreme Court unanimously remanded Expressions II to
the Second Circuit, it potentially opened the door to an extended
interpretation of First Amendment violations that "could draw into
question large swaths of consumer protection regulation."2 a However,
under the interpretation that the New York law regulates speech, not
conduct, the Supreme Court correctly remanded the case for the
Second Circuit to resolve its constitutionality.
While the Court did not definitively instruct the Second Circuit's
further analysis, it did provide the Second Circuit with several routes
for a remedy.0 ' Given the development of the litigation and the
history of the New York statute, the Second Circuit should deem the
law a regulation on commercial speech. With that understanding, it
should apply Central Hudson and conclude that the law is able to survive
intermediate scrutiny and withstand constitutional muster. On the
other hand, if the Second Circuit declines to interpret the statute as a
regulation on commercial speech, it should either certify the case to
the New York Court of Appeals for a clear interpretation of the
statute,m or it should interpret the law as a factual disclosure
requirement and deem it constitutional.
A. On remand, the Second Circuit should find that New York's law escapes
the strict scrutiny of traditional First Amendment analyses and suruives the
intermediate scrutiny of Central Hudson
During the Second Circuit's hearing of Expressions I, New York
maintained that even assuming the anti-surcharge law was subject to
the First Amendment as a regulation on speech, it escaped strict
scrutiny because it was a justifiable regulation under Central Hudson's
202. See id.; Dana's RR Supply, 807 F.3d at 1245-46 (concluding that the "glass-half-
full" scenario is exactly synonymous with the anti-surcharge law in regulating the
choice between "equally plausible" values).
203. See Expressions I, 808 F.3d at 129.
204. See Moloshok, supra note 23, at 1.
205. See supra Section I.B.3 for a discussion of the court's suggestions.
206. See supra notes 169-80 and accompanying text.
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intermediate scrutiny analysis." The Supreme Court declined to
consider this question in the first instance and remanded the case with
the expectation that the parties could raise it in the lower court." On
remand, the Second Circuit should find that even though New York's
law does regulate speech, it regulates commercial speech, and an
application of the Central Hudson test demonstrates that the statute
survives intermediate scrutiny.
Under the Central Hudson test-which indicates when commercial
speech is either protected from unwarranted government regulation
under the First Amendment or subject to government regulation for
the purpose of guaranteeing a greater public interest 2"-the NewYork
law is properly regulated as commercial speech. When conducting its
Central Hudson analysis of New York's anti-surcharge law, the Second
Circuit will likely consider the case's definition of commercial speech:
"[an] expression related solely to the economic interests of the speaker
and its audience."2"o Under this definition, New York's law falls within
the commercial speech doctrine as an expression about pricing that
relates solely to the economic interests of both the merchant ("the
speaker") and the consumer ("its audience")."'
The first prong of the test inquires whether the speech concerns
lawful activity and is not misleading, therefore assuring that the speech
is the kind protected by the First Amendment."' The NewYork statute
easily passes this requirement. The statute describes lawful activity-
the exchange of payment between merchant and consumer-and is
not misleading as it clearly conveys that the regulation applies in
merchant customer exchanges where the merchant may wish to make
a purchase with a credit card. 1 3
207. Expressions I, 808 F.3dat 130.
208. Expressions D, 137 S. Ct. 1144, 1152 (2017).
209. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S.
557, 566 (1980) (articulating the four-pronged test: (1) determine whether the speech
concerns lawful activity and is not misleading; (2) evaluate whether the asserted
governmental interest is substantial; (3) assess whether regulation directly advances
the government interest; and (4) assert that it is not more extensive than is necessary
to serve that interest).
210. Id. at 561 (affixing the commercial speech label to an order requiring New
York electric utilities to cease all advertising that promotes the use of electricity).
211. Id.
212. See id. at 563 (asserting that the First Amendment does not protect information
intended to deceive its listeners).
213. N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 518 (McKinney 1984); Expressions II, 137 S. Ct. at 1151
(concluding that the merchants' vagueness challenge against the statute gave the
Court "little pause").
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The second prong of the test asks whether the asserted government
interest is substantial." When it applies this prong to the New York
law, it is likely that the Second Circuit will employ a different approach
than the Eleventh Circuit, finding that the government interest is
substantial. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that states are
best suited to create laws amenable to their citizens, and states are thus
given wide latitude to regulate their economies as they see fit."' The
differences in the states' anti-surcharge laws evidence the states' ability
to regulate according to the needs of their people. Though the laws
work to accomplish similar ends, they all contain slight variations in
reaching those goals."' Therefore, the second prong is likely satisfied.
Prong three asks whether the regulation directly advances the
governmental interest asserted."' Again, this is likely satisfied. New
York's asserted government interest is to prevent merchants from
passing credit card swipe fees onto their customers, and New York's
law does exactly that. Its purpose and effect is to disallow stores from
passing swipe fees along to customers." As such, it advances the state
interest in preventing consumers from being subject to the fees that
accompany a credit card swipe. Further, it perpetuates the broader
government interest of giving states the authority to determine and
implement the best business regulations for their specific
communities." A failure to acknowledge this as an important state
interest would undermine New York's ability to govern autonomously
and would disrupt longstanding precedent in allowing states to
develop their own economically focused legislation.
The fourth prong ensures that the regulation is not more extensive
than necessary to serve that government interest.2 20 Again, the court
would likely find that the New York law satisfies this prong of the test.
While the law does regulate speech, it is not so restrictive as to prevent
merchants from engaging in dual-pricing systems or to require them
to convey specific messages about credit card swipe fees. Additionally,
it does not proscribe the exact language that stores must use in
214. See Cent. Hudson Gas, 447 U.S. at 566 (laying out the four-part test).
215. See supra Section II.A.
216. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
217. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
218. See Expressions I, 137 S. Ct. at 1151.
219. See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 523 (1934) (holding that it is both the
state's right and burden to have the autonomy to implement the most effective
business regulations for its citizens).
220. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S.
557, 566 (1980).
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communicating with consumers and does not stop merchants from
expressing their preferred payment methods. What New York's law
does is eliminate the possibility that merchants may shift swipe fees
onto the customer. It restricts merchants from erroneously adding
charges to their consumer base and protects customers from being
bombarded with unfair or unnecessary fees. As such, the Second
Circuit would likely find the law satisfies the final element of the test,
concluding that the law survives the intermediate scrutiny of Central
Hudson. Consequently, the Second Circuit should find that New York's
law does not violate the First Amendment.
B. If the Second Circuit does not interpret New York's anti-surcharge law as
commercial speech, it should either certify the case to the Court ofAppeals or
interpret the law as a valid disclosure requirement
The lack of clarity surrounding New York's statute permeated the
Court's opinion in Expressions II.1` If the Second Circuit concludes
that it cannot classify the law as a regulation of commercial speech, it
is likely because of the amount of confusion surrounding the law and
its purpose. If this comes to pass, the court should certify the case to
the New York Court of Appeals so that the state court may provide a
definitive interpretation of the law. The New York Court of Appeals'
interpretation would allow the Second Circuit to finally determine
whether the law violates the First Amendment.222
Alternatively, the Second Circuit might recognize the speech
regulated by New York's law as merely "factual and uncontroversial
information" about merchant pricing schemes.2 . If the Second
Circuit understands the law in this way, it would find Central Hudson
inappropriate because even intermediate scrutiny might be too severe
a test. The Second Circuit would then consider the law a mere
disclosure requirement for merchants and would only require that it
be reasonably related to New York's interests. It is possible that
because the Second Circuit previously interpreted New York's law as a
regulation of conduct rather than one of speech, the court is more
221. See Expressions II, 137 S. Ct. 1144, 1151 (2017) (proposing the various ways in
which the law could be applied and may be argued upon remand).
222. See supra notes 180-84 and accompanying text (suggesting the Second Circuit
will follow the Eleventh Circuit's finding that the surcharge law does not pass even
intermediate scrutiny).
223. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio,
471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985) (detailing that speech with a minor impact on First
Amendment interests need only be reasonably related to a state's interests to pass
constitutional muster).
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concerned with applying First Amendment scrutiny to the kinds of
interests that the Amendment seeks to protect, and is therefore
inclined to treat New York's law as a disclosure requirement. This
interpretation would closely align with Justice Breyer's perspective,
taking a narrower approach to the First Amendment by concentrating
on the interests implicated by the kind of speech at stake.
If the Second Circuit does not automatically interpret the law as a
regulation of commercial speech, the ambiguity surrounding the
statute and its effects on business and consumer relations should be at
the forefront of the court's analysis.
CONCLUSION
First Amendment protections are inextricably tied to notions of
liberty and freedom-and rightfully so. The Amendment ensures that
citizens are not subject to the whims of an oppressive government; it
ensures civil society's ability to think, to change, and to create; it is what
assures that expressions are not overly monitored or unnecessarily
regulated and delineates what it means to live in a free society. While
the Amendment's scope is contentious and always has been,
construing attacks on speech where they do not exist trivializes its
freedoms. Finding First Amendment violations in anti-surcharge laws
thus belittles the expressions that the Amendment protects.
By treating Florida's anti-surcharge law as a First Amendment
violation, the Eleventh Circuit misconstrued commercial speech
jurisprudence to favor its own loosely related hypothetical. In
reviewing Expressions II on remand, the Second Circuit should be
careful not to do the same. Because New York's law fits the category of
commercial speech and because longstanding emphasis on each state's
interest in regulating its economic activity demonstrates that the law
should survive intermediate scrutiny under Central Hudson, the law
does not pose a First Amendment violation. Even if the Second Circuit
does not interpret the law as a regulation on commercial speech, the
uncertainty surrounding the law's meaning and the economic nature
of the law preclude it from receiving the severe treatment of the strict
scrutiny analysis found in traditional speech regulations.
On remand, the Second Circuit should recognize that regardless of
the way it interprets New York's anti-surcharge law, an overextension
of the First Amendment only harms free speech. As such, finding an
anti-surcharge law to be a First Amendment violation marks an
irresponsible extension of constitutional liberties.
